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Abstract
Current reform proposals in international and corporate tax (most notably the OECD’s GloBE
proposal) envisage taxing financial statement income. This paper develops a conceptual
framework – based on the literature on the elasticity of taxable income – for the welfare analysis
of such proposals, and discusses the available evidence on the tax elasticity of financial statement
income. The central conclusion is that the most relevant evidence suggests a large responsiveness
of financial statement income to taxes (and hence, albeit with significant limitations and caveats,
arguably a large deadweight loss). The paper also highlights the need for more evidence on this
question.
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1) Introduction
There has been growing attention among policymakers and the general public to the
taxation of multinational corporations (MNCs) in recent years. This paper analyzes aspects of
current reform proposals that have combined this widespread concern over MNC taxation with an
earlier strand of discussion regarding book-tax divergence among corporations (e.g. Desai, 2005;
Shaviro, 2008; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009a). Most prominently, the ongoing work of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the G-20 group of
governments on international tax reform has led to the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) proposal
(also known as “Pillar Two”), foreshadowed in a public consultation document issued in late 2019
(OECD, 2019a). This envisages the use of financial statement income as a possible tax base for a
global minimum tax on MNCs. Moreover, a number of policy proposals within the US – such as
the “Real Corporate Profits Tax”1 proposed by Senator Warren’s Presidential campaign in April,
2019 – also seek to tax financial statement income.2
The various challenges that led the OECD (2019a) to contemplate taxing book income in
its GloBE proposal are illustrated in Figure 1. Assume an MNC group consists of a parent in
country A and an affiliate in a lower-tax jurisdiction B. The GloBE proposal aims to ensure that
the MNC’s income in B is subject to a minimum tax rate. The primary mechanism for this is an
“income inclusion rule” involving the imposition by country A of an additional tax if the MNC’s
effective tax rate falls below the GloBE regime’s minimum rate. However, it is far from
straightforward to determine the MNC’s effective tax rate on a global basis and to define the
relevant tax base for the global minimum tax. In this context, it is helpful to distinguish between
the tax base (denoted 𝑌 ) and taxable income defined by tax law and tax accounting rules (𝑌 ).
Possibilities considered in OECD (2019a) include using the tax law of each country to compute
the tax base (option (i) in Figure 1; however, this is subject to the concern that country B’s tax law
may strategically set a narrow tax base), and using country A’s tax law to compute the income of
all subsidiaries (option (ii) in Figure 1; however, this would entail large compliance costs by

1

This proposed tax would be imposed at a 7% rate on the worldwide consolidated financial income of US-resident
corporations. Unlike some other current proposals, this would be in addition to the regular corporate income tax, rather
than being an alternative minimum tax – see the description and revenue estimate at:
https://elizabethwarren.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Saez-and-Zucman-Letter-on-Real-Corporate-Profits-Tax4.10.19-2.pdf
2
See Herzfeld (2020) for more extensive discussion of these proposals and of the wider policy context, and Devereux
(2020) for an assessment of the GloBE proposal.
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requiring complex calculations that the firm would not otherwise need to undertake). The solution
mooted in OECD (2019a) is to use the consolidated (i.e. worldwide) financial statement income
(denoted 𝑌 ) of the MNC as the tax base for determining the effective tax rate for purposes of the
global minimum tax.3
As noted in Shaviro (2020) and elsewhere, academic researchers in accounting appear to
be uniformly opposed to any imposition of tax consequences on financial statement income. The
main reasons include the potential reduction in the informativeness of accounting earnings when
firms engage in tax-motivated downward earnings management, and the possibility of political
pressure on financial accounting standard setting bodies by governments seeking to increase tax
revenue (e.g. Hanlon and Shevlin, 2005; see also Freedman (2004) and Herzfeld (2020) for
discussions of these and other concerns).
There are also important considerations grounded in public finance theory and tax policy
design that are relevant to this issue. Tax policy does not necessarily share financial accounting’s
primary goal of measuring the income of the corporate entity from the perspective of investors.
For instance, it may quite reasonably take account of personal as well as corporate tax burdens.
The taxation of corporate income creates a variety of distortions (e.g. Dharmapala, 2017a), and
some proposals to address them – for instance, a cash flow tax that exempts the normal return to
capital – may entail further divergence from 𝑌 . A wide range of tax policy choices deliberately
depart from financial accounting principles, for example because questions of timing are more
important in the tax realm.
Notwithstanding these concerns, proponents of taxing 𝑌 argue that the political process
by which tax law is determined is flawed, in particular by taxpayer lobbying that leads the tax base
to be too small. Delegating the determination of the tax base to a nongovernmental institution that
sets financial accounting standards may thus be viewed by proponents as a crucial advantage
(although such delegation could also raise concerns over a loss of democratic accountability, as
argued by Herzfeld (2020)).4 More generally, it seems difficult to rule out on a priori grounds the
OECD (2019a) is not completely clear on how, or to what extent, 𝑌 would subsequently be unconsolidated to
allocate income across jurisdictions. However, reading OECD (2019a) in the light of the earlier Pillar One proposal
(OECD, 2019b) suggests allocation by a formula based on factors such as the location of sales. This assumption is
made for concreteness in the model developed in Section 2 below.
4
For example, a recent defense of proposals to tax book income (Clausing, Saez and Zucman, 2020, p. 8) argues that
a “minimum tax on . . . global book profits . . . can be seen as a monitoring device that alerts the IRS to failures to set
an adequately broad tax base” and that while a “first-best solution . . . is to make sure the tax base reflects policymakers best assessment of how taxable income should be defined . . . if such policy changes are too politically
3
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possibility that the welfare costs of introducing a small distortion to financial accounting reports
might be outweighed by welfare gains elsewhere - for instance, from increased tax revenue or from
reduced deadweight costs of tax planning (e.g. Shaviro, 2008; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009a).
Ultimately, whether this is the case is an empirical question that depends on factors such
as the responsiveness of 𝑌 to the imposition of a tax (i.e. on the tax elasticity of 𝑌 ). This paper
discusses how to conceptualize what evidence might be relevant, and outlines some of the existing
evidence. It takes as its starting point the influential literature in public finance on the elasticity of
taxable income (ETI). Feldstein (1999) established that the ETI is a sufficient statistic for the
deadweight loss from taxation under fairly general conditions (and regardless of whether 𝑌
changes due to real responses or to tax avoidance, as the marginal costs of each activity are equated
to the tax rate by optimizing taxpayers).
This paper presents a simple model of profit shifting (based on Dharmapala (2017a)) and
characterizes the circumstances in which the magnitude of profit shifting is a sufficient statistic for
its deadweight cost. The model is then modified to represent a scenario in which 𝑌 is redefined
as 𝑌 and the firm is able to engage in (costly) downward earnings management to reduce 𝑌 .
This formulation is used to characterize the circumstances in which the tax elasticity of 𝑌 is a
sufficient statistic for the deadweight cost of earnings management. As is well-known, there are
significant exceptions to the claim that the ETI is sufficient to assess deadweight loss. Most
relevant for our setting is the situation in which the costs incurred by a firm engaging in tax
avoidance (or tax-motivated earnings management) are not social costs but transfers (such as
payments to accountants and other professionals). The framework developed in this paper
suggests, however, that the circumstances in which the ETI of 𝑌 is not a sufficient statistic for
the deadweight loss from earnings management are very similar to the conditions under which the
ETI of 𝑌

is not a sufficient statistic for the deadweight loss from profit shifting. Thus, if one

believes that profit shifting is a significant concern based on estimates of the magnitude of profit
shifting, one should also believe that a large ETI of 𝑌 indicates a large deadweight loss from
taxing 𝑌 .5

contentious, a minimum tax on book income may be a second-best way to ensure that companies perceived as
profitable pay some minimum amount of tax.”
5
It is possible that profit shifting may be a problem – due to revenue losses or “optics” – even if the deadweight loss
is small. However, especially given the relatively modest role of the corporate income tax in generating tax revenue,
efficiency considerations should arguably play a major role in assessing profit shifting and policies to combat it.

3
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Representative estimates of the ETI for corporate income under current arrangements
(where the tax base is typically 𝑌 ) are around 0.2 (or less) with respect to the net-of-tax share
(e.g. Gruber and Rauh, 2007; Devereux, Liu and Loretz, 2014). There are no explicit estimates of
the ETI for 𝑌 . However, an episode from the 1980s in the United States can potentially shed some
light on this question. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) introduced the corporate Alternative
Minimum Tax (AMT), which for tax years 1987-1989 involved what was known as the Book
Income Adjustment (BIA) or Business Untaxed Reported Profit (BURP) adjustment. This entailed
that firms facing the AMT were required to add 50% of 𝑌 to 𝑌

in determining their tax base

for AMT purposes. There is a substantial accounting literature from the 1990s that analyzes
earnings management in response to the BIA. While generally finding statistically significant
effects, this literature does not discuss the magnitude (and of course does not use the ETI concept,
which was developed later in public finance). However, it is possible to infer an implied ETI from
some of these studies (e.g. Dhaliwal and Wang, 1992; Manzon, 1992); this turns out to be much
larger than that for 𝑌 , in the range of about 1.4 to 2.1 with respect to the net-of-tax share.6
One possible interpretation is that downward earnings management of 𝑌 is relatively
unconstrained by financial accounting rules (which have developed primarily to police the
overstatement of 𝑌 ), while downward management of 𝑌

is quite strongly constrained by tax

law. Of course, there are many caveats with respect to the estimates inferred from studies of the
BIA. Within the accounting literature, significant questions have been raised about the robustness
of the results to alternative scaling variables and control groups (Choi, Gramlich and Thomas,
2001) and about the extent to which treatment and control groups are randomly assigned
(Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). The results may also reflect short-run responses (although there
are also a number of reasons why they may under-estimate the responsiveness of 𝑌 ).
If the results from the BIA literature are not viewed as being credible or relevant, we are
left with the prior beliefs of scholars in financial accounting, which lean very much towards an
expectation that the effects would be large (implying a large deadweight cost in the ETI
framework). The paper concludes that the challenge for proponents of current proposals to tax 𝑌
is to produce evidence showing a small and precisely estimated impact of taxes on 𝑌 , or to explain
why a large ETI of 𝑌 is not relevant for assessing the normative desirability of these proposals.
6

While there are other published studies of earnings management in response to the BIA (e.g. Boynton, Dobbins and
Plesko, 1992), it is not feasible to infer an ETI from their reported results and descriptive statistics.

4
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Section 2 describes the ETI concept and presents a simple model characterizing the welfare
consequences of profit shifting and of tax-motivated earnings management. Section 3 discusses
empirical estimates of the (reported or implied) ETI for 𝑌

and 𝑌 . Section 4 discusses the

implications and various caveats, and Section 5 concludes.
2) The Elasticity of Taxable Income as a Measure of the Efficiency Cost of Taxation
2.1) The Elasticity of Taxable Income
A central challenge in public finance is to draw inferences that are relevant for normative
analysis from parameters that can feasibly be empirically estimated. In a major contribution that
has given rise to a large literature on the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), Feldstein (1999) argues
that it is possible – under certain assumptions – to infer the deadweight cost of taxation simply
from the responsiveness of reported income to the tax rate. Denoting taxable income by Y and the
tax rate by t, ETI is typically defined with respect to the net-of-tax rate (1 – t) as follows:
𝐸𝑇𝐼

𝜕𝑌
𝜕 1 𝑡
𝑌
1 𝑡

(1)

Under this definition, the ETI is typically positive; it can be approximated by the percentage
change in taxable income divided by the percentage change in the net-of-tax rate. The ETI reflects
avoidance and evasion as well as real responses. In Feldstein’s (1999) framework, the taxpayer
equates the marginal cost of avoidance and its marginal benefit (which is the tax rate t), while also
equating the marginal cost of reducing labor supply to t. It follows that it does not matter for
calculating the deadweight cost whether the responsiveness of Y is due to real responses or to
avoidance. This result provides public finance scholars with a simple and elegant approach for
computing the deadweight loss of taxation without considering the channels through which these
effects operate (e.g. Dharmapala, 2017b).
This basic framework views the ETI as being determined by preferences and constraints
(such as the “technology” of tax avoidance). However, as analyzed by Slemrod and Kopczuk
(2002), it is also possible to view policymakers as choosing the tax base, and therefore the ETI.
The exercise below involves comparing two alternative tax bases (𝑌

and 𝑌 ) that potentially

have different elasticities; arguably, this implicates the elasticity of the tax base, rather than that
of taxable income for a given tax base.
5
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It is well-known that there are circumstances in which Feldstein’s (1999) result fails to
hold (e.g. Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012). Some of these – such as when taxpayers shift income
across personal and corporate tax bases – are unlikely to be directly relevant here. Intertemporal
shifting of income is clearly of relevance, and is discussed below. Also pertinent is that the result
depends crucially on the cost of avoidance being a social cost rather than a transfer (Chetty, 2009).
Taxpayers equate their marginal private cost of avoidance to t. If this is (at least in part) a transfer
to other agents whose welfare enters into the social welfare function, then it will not be the case at
the taxpayer’s optimum that the marginal social cost of avoidance equals t (and therefore the ETI
is not a sufficient statistic for the deadweight loss). In these circumstances, the nature of the
taxpayer response that generates the change in taxable income matters for welfare analysis.7
2.2) The Deadweight Loss from Profit Shifting
Before proceeding to discuss how the ETI approach can potentially be applied to the
taxation of financial statement income, we begin by characterizing the circumstances in which the
magnitude of profit shifting is a sufficient statistic for its deadweight cost. This formulation uses
a simple model of profit shifting from Dharmapala (2017a), based on the framework in
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013). Consider an MNC that consists of affiliates in countries a and b.
These affiliates earn exogenous pretax profits 𝜋 and face corporate tax rates 𝑡 , where 𝑖 ∈ 𝑎, 𝑏 .
Assume that the MNC is a resident of country a, which is the higher-tax country (i.e. 𝑡

𝑡 ).

Country a is assumed to have an exemption system under which the MNC’s foreign profits are not
taxed by the residence country. The MNC can shift reported profit between the two affiliates by
incurring an increasing, convex cost C 𝑦 , where y is the amount of profit shifted.
The most natural interpretation of C 𝑦 is that it consists of payments (such as wages) to
tax planning professionals. Assuming that the tax planners are located in the headquarters country
a, it follows that C 𝑦 is tax-deductible in country a (although this assumption is not crucial to the
results). These payments in themselves are merely a transfer (i.e. as the tax planners’ welfare enters
into the social welfare function, their gains offset the (private) cost C 𝑦 borne by the MNC).
However, tax planning gives rise to a social cost if tax planners’ output in their best alternative
occupation would have been socially valuable (in contrast to their tax planning activity, which
7

For instance, Slemrod (1990) suggests a hierarchy of taxpayer responses, with the timing of transactions being the
most responsive, followed by financial transactions giving rise to income shifting, with real decisions being the least
responsive; the potentially differing welfare consequences of each response must be taken into account when welfare
analysis cannot rest solely on the ETI.

6
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simply generates transfers). In a competitive labor market, they would earn a negligible premium
over what they would have earned in this alternative occupation, so C 𝑦 is a reasonable
approximation of the deadweight cost of the misallocation of effort from socially valuable to
socially wasteful activities. The assumption above that profits are exogenous rules out other forms
of deadweight loss (for instance, from the reallocation of real activity from a to b), in order to
focus on this particular social cost (which is relatively similar in nature across the two types of tax
bases that we study).8
The tax law of country a defines taxable income as 𝑌
𝑌

b defines taxable income as 𝑌

𝜋

𝑌

𝜋

𝑦

𝐶 𝑦 ; country

𝑦. The MNC’s global after-tax profits, denoted by

Π, are:
Π

1

𝑡

𝑦

𝜋

𝐶 𝑦

1

𝑡

𝑦

𝜋

(2)

The MNC chooses y to maximize Π, setting:
𝐶 𝑦

𝑡
1

𝑡
𝑡

(3)

Global welfare can be characterized as the sum of the MNC’s after-tax global profits and
countries’ tax revenue:9
𝑊

Π∗

𝑡 𝜋

𝑦

𝐶 𝑦

𝑡 𝜋

𝑦

(4)

Assuming 𝑡 is fixed, the welfare impact of a small change in 𝑡 can be found by differentiating
𝑊

with respect to 𝑡 while holding 𝑡 constant. Π ∗ in Equation (4) is the maximized value of

the MNC’s profits, so an envelope theorem argument (analogous, for example, to that used in
Chetty (2009)) implies that behavioral responses can be ignored when differentiating Π ∗ with
respect to 𝑡 . Thus, holding 𝑡 constant:
𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝑡

𝜋

𝑦

𝐶 𝑦

𝜋

𝑦

𝐶 𝑦

𝑡

𝑑 𝜋

𝑦
𝑑𝑡

𝐶 𝑦

𝑡

𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝑡

(5)

Thus, under the assumptions made above, Equation (5) shows that the responsiveness of taxable
income 𝑌 to the tax rate is a sufficient statistic for the marginal deadweight loss from profit
shifting.
8
Moreover, if we adopt the common definition of tax avoidance as “the lawful reduction of tax obligations, while
maintaining the same substantive economic outcome” (Dharmapala, 2017b, p. xv), then isolating the deadweight cost
of tax avoidance per se entails abstracting from real responses.
9
In its policy choices, it is more realistic to assume that country a maximizes its national welfare 𝑊 rather than global
welfare (Dharmapala, 2017a). However, this does not affect the results here, as 𝑊 differs from Equation (4) only by
omitting country b’s tax revenue.
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2.3) The Deadweight Loss from Earnings Management
Now suppose instead that taxable income is defined as the MNC’s worldwide consolidated
financial statement income 𝑌 , including discretionary accruals or other adjustments that are not
part of tax law, denoted A (which is defined here as being positive to reflect the incentives for
downward earnings management in this setting, though this could be relaxed without affecting the
conclusions). The MNC is assumed to incur an increasing convex cost 𝑀 𝐴 to engage in earning
management to reduce its reported 𝑌 . As with the cost of profit shifting C 𝑦 , the most natural
interpretation of 𝑀 𝐴 is as payments to accounting practitioners. In a manner closely analogous
to our prior discussion, earnings management creates social costs if accountants’ foregone output
is socially valuable, and in a competitive labor market, 𝑀 𝐴 is a reasonable approximation to this
deadweight cost. Assuming that 𝑀 𝐴 is treated as a cost under financial accounting rules, 𝑌
𝜋

𝜋

𝐴

𝑀 𝐴 .

It is not entirely clear from OECD (2019a) how 𝑌 would be allocated across countries
under the GloBE proposal. However, reading OECD (2019a) in the light of the earlier Pillar One
proposal (OECD, 2019b) suggests that 𝑌 may be allocated by a formula based on factors such as
the location of sales. Thus, we assume here that each country is allocated an exogenous share of
𝑌 denoted 𝑓 , where 𝑖 ∈ 𝑎, 𝑏 .10 This formulation implies that our comparison of the alternative
tax bases 𝑌

and 𝑌 also implicates the choice between separate accounting (as in the profit

shifting model above) and formulary apportionment (FA). The choices are conceptually separable:
for instance, an FA system could in principle be based on tax law definitions of income. However,
the taxation of 𝑌 is bundled with FA in the OECD’s proposals; more generally, it may in practice
be difficult to unbundle these because of the typically consolidated nature of 𝑌 .11
Under the assumptions above, the MNC’s taxable income subject to tax by country i is
𝑌

𝑓 𝑌 . The MNC’s global after-tax profits are:
Π

𝜋

𝜋

𝑀 𝐴

𝑡 𝑓 𝜋

𝜋

𝐴

𝑀 𝐴

𝑡 𝑓 𝜋

𝜋

𝐴

𝑀 𝐴

(6)

The MNC chooses A to maximize Π, setting:

It would be natural to assume further that 𝑓 𝑓
1, but this is not necessary for the points being made here.
As is well-known (e.g. Altshuler and Grubert, 2010), a potentially important type of distortion from FA entails
changes in firms’ ownership of assets across borders to influence the apportionment factors. The assumption here that
profits are exogenous entails ignoring this distortion, but it should be borne in mind as an additional cost of taxing 𝑌
when that is combined with FA.
10
11
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𝑀 𝐴

𝑡 𝑓 𝑡 𝑓
1 𝑡 𝑓 𝑡 𝑓

(7)

Global welfare is:
Π∗

𝑊

𝑡 𝑓 𝜋

𝜋

𝐴

𝑀 𝐴

𝑡 𝑓 𝜋

𝜋

𝐴

𝑀 𝐴

(8)

As before, Π ∗ in Equation (8) is the maximized value of the MNC’s profits, and the envelope
theorem argument invoked earlier implies that behavioral responses can be ignored when
differentiating Π ∗ with respect to 𝑡 , while holding 𝑡 constant:
𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝑡

𝑓𝑌

𝑓𝑌

𝑡 𝑓

𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝑡

𝑡

𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝑡

(9)

Thus, under the assumptions made above, Equation (9) shows that the responsiveness of taxable
income 𝑌

𝑓 𝑌 to the tax rate is a sufficient statistic for the marginal deadweight loss from

tax-motivated earnings management.
The discussion in OECD (2019b) envisages that a normal or routine return would be
exempted from the income that is apportioned by formula. This can be accommodated by assuming
that exogenous returns 𝜋

𝜋 and 𝜋

𝜋 are subtracted from the income that is allocated. In

addition, Equation (6) assumes implicitly that the MNC’s “true” profit does not include A. It might
instead be assumed (as many proponents of taxing financial statement income would contend) that
its “true” profit is better measured by 𝑌 . With these changes, Equation (6) can be rewritten as:
Π

𝜋

𝜋

𝐴

𝑀 𝐴

𝑡 𝑓 𝑌

𝜋

𝜋

𝜋

𝑡 𝑓 𝑌

𝜋

𝜋

𝜋

(10)

However, the result in Equation (9) is not fundamentally affected by this reformulation.
3) The ETI for Tax Law Income versus Financial Statement Income
3.1) Empirical Estimates of the ETI of Corporate Tax Law Income
The early ETI literature (reviewed in Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012)) focused primarily
on taxpayer responses to the individual income tax. More recently, there has developed a body of
research seeking to estimate the ETI for corporate income. Implicitly, this pertains to the elasticity
of what we have termed tax law income (𝑌 ) with respect to taxes, as that is how taxable income
is generally defined in the settings that have been studied. While there are other estimates of the
corporate ETI in the literature, two studies (Gruber and Rauh, 2007; Devereux, Liu and Loretz,
2014) are used in Table 1 for illustrative purposes.

9
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Gruber and Rauh (2007) use Compustat data on publicly-traded US firms over 1960-2003
to estimate the corporate ETI. Although they use financial statement data, it is important to
emphasize that their aim is to infer taxable income 𝑌

from information in the financial

statements; it is not their objective to estimate the tax elasticity of 𝑌 . Using this inferred 𝑌

and

a measure of effective tax rates (ETRs) computed from financial statement data, they find an ETI
(with respect to the net-of-tax share, as defined in Equation (1)) of about 0.2, as shown in Table 1.
This is comparable to the magnitude of the ETI for individual income (e.g. Saez, Slemrod and
Giertz, 2012) and implies a relatively modest marginal deadweight loss from corporate taxation.
Devereux, Liu and Loretz (2014) estimate the ETI for UK firms using confidential
company tax returns over 2001-2009 provided by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
Their analysis – following an approach developed by Saez (2010) - infers the ETI using the extent
of bunching at “kinks” in the company tax schedule (i.e. at income levels where the marginal tax
rate changes). Around the kink at £300,000, they estimate an ETI of between 0.13 and 0.17 (as
also shown in Table 1).12
The estimates described above do not relate specifically to profit shifting across
jurisdictions (although that is implicitly among the potential mechanisms of tax avoidance for
those firms that are MNCs). Dharmapala (2014) surveys the evidence on profit shifting and reports
a representative consensus estimate from the literature of a semi-elasticity of reported income with
respect to the tax rate differential across countries of 0.8. This entails that a ten percentage point
increase in the tax rate difference between an affiliate and its parent would increase the income
reported by the affiliate by eight per cent. As it is derived from a log-linear specification, the semielasticity varies across different tax rates, and is typically evaluated at the sample mean tax rate.
For instance, suppose that both countries a and b initially have a tax rate of 35%. Then, a reduction
in country b’s rate to 25% (which represents an increase of about 15.4% in the net-of-tax share in
country b, from 0.65 to 0.75) would lead to an 8% increase in affiliate b’s reported income. If this
is the only response of affiliate b to the tax change,13 then the implied ETI would be about 0.5,
which is somewhat larger than those in the fourth column of Table 1, but much smaller than those
discussed below for 𝑌 .
12

They find a larger ETI around the £10,000 kink, but this is not as relevant for the discussion here because of the
extremely small size of these firms.
13
Note that these studies seek to isolate profit shifting from real responses such as changes in the location of economic
activity (e.g. by controlling for capital inputs). Thus, this elasticity arguably only reflects profit shifting.
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3.2) Inferring the ETI for Financial Statement Income
Our aim is to compare the ETI for situations in which taxable income is defined by tax law
(𝑌

𝑌 ) to the ETI in situations where taxable income is defined as being equal to financial

statement income (𝑌

𝑌 ). The latter is not readily observable, because – even though different

jurisdictions differ in their degree of book-tax conformity - financial statement income is generally
not explicitly taxed. One exception that, albeit now quite far in the past, provides an important
potential source of evidence is the Book Income Adjustment (BIA) that was an element of the
corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) in
the United States.
In general, corporations are required under the AMT regime to pay the greater of their tax
liability under “regular” tax law and under the AMT (which applies a lower rate to a more
extensive base). For a brief period (the tax years 1987, 1988 and 1989) the AMT base included an
adjustment based on book income: the BIA, also known as the “Business Untaxed Reported Profit”
(BURP) adjustment (e.g. Dhaliwal and Wang, 1992). Specifically, denote income under “regular”
tax law by 𝑌

and the AMT tax base by 𝑌 . Let P be the statutory preferences and deductions

that are allowed under regular tax law but disallowed under the AMT. The BIA entailed adding
50% of the difference between a firm’s financial statement income 𝑌 and its (tentative) AMT
income (i.e. excluding the BIA itself) to the AMT base. That is:
BIA

0.5 𝑌

𝑌

𝑃

(11)

Thus, the AMT base can be expressed as:
𝑌

𝑌

𝑃

0.5 𝑌

𝑌

𝑃

0.5 𝑌

𝑃

𝑌

Over the relevant period, the AMT was imposed at a 20% rate on 𝑌

(12)
. Thus, those firms

that were subject to the AMT (i.e. those for which the AMT liability exceeded their tax liability
under the regular tax) faced what amounted to a 10% tax on 𝑌 . The BIA is thus one of the closest
analogs to the current proposals for taxing 𝑌 that has ever been implemented (although there are
of course some significant differences between the BIA and the current proposals).
As foreshadowed in TRA86 at the time of is enactment, the BIA was replaced in 1990 and
subsequent years by an adjustment that did not reference financial statement income, and has not
been revived since. Thus, the taxation of 𝑌 represented a short-lived experiment in US tax law.
Nonetheless, there is a significant academic literature in accounting from the 1990s seeking to test
whether firms subject to the AMT managed their financial statement income downwards in the
11
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affected years (1987-1989). It does not refer to the concept of the ETI, which was only developed
in the public finance literature at a later time. Indeed, the papers on the BIA do not even discuss
the magnitude of their estimates of tax-motivated earnings management; they were written at a
time when (not only in accounting but across empirical disciplines) it was common to focus
primarily on the statistical significance of estimated coefficients rather than on the implications of
the magnitudes of these coefficients. Nonetheless, it is possible (under certain assumptions) to
derive an implied ETI from the published estimates and descriptive statistics.
Dhaliwal and Wang (1992) use Compustat data over 1985-1988 to compute ETRs, and
classify firms with ETRs below 23% in 1986 as being potentially affected by the AMT and BIA.
In essence, their approach estimates the change in the book-tax gap scaled by book income (in our
notation, (𝑌

𝑌

/𝑌 ) for the affected group of firms once the AMT comes into effect in 1987.

Their estimated coefficient in a regression of the scaled book-tax gap on the ETR implies that the
scaled book-tax gap falls by 0.27 in 1987 for affected firms relative to unaffected firms.14 Dhaliwal
and Wang (1992) do not report the baseline scaled book-tax gap prior to the reform, but in the
Compustat data used in Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009b) the mean scaled book-tax gap is 0.14.15 Then, taking account of TRA86’s reduction in the corporate tax rate, the regression results
in Dhaliwal and Wang (1992, Table 4) imply a 17% decline in 𝑌 from 1986 to 1987, in response
to a decrease in the net-of-tax share by 10% (i.e. from 1 to 0.9) when the firm is subject to the
AMT and the BIA. This corresponds to an ETI of approximately 1.7 for 𝑌 , as shown in Table
1.16
Manzon (1992) uses hand-collected data on firms that are subject to the AMT (as revealed
in the relevant footnotes of their disclosures). Among these firms, Manzon (1992) identifies
variation in the degree of exposure to the AMT and BIA based on the availability of net operating
losses (NOLs), unused investment tax credits (ITCs) and foreign tax credits (FTCs). In particular,
14

They estimate a coefficient of 0.744 for 1987 (Table 4). The mean ETR for affected firms is 3.3% while that for
unaffected firms is 40.2%, and 0.744*(0.033 – 0.402) = -0.27.
15
See Desai and Dharmapala (2009b, Table 1), where the book-tax gap (scaled by assets) is -0.0074 and pretax (book)
income scaled by assets is 0.0544, yielding a ratio of -0.14.
16
The 0.27 fall in the scaled book-tax gap implies a fall from -0.14 to -0.41. Normalizing 𝑌 in 1986 to $1, it follows
𝑌 /𝑌 ) = -0.41 in 1987, which implies that 1.41𝑌 = 𝑌 in 1987. Assuming
that 𝑌 = $1.14 in 1986, while ((𝑌
𝑌 is fixed (i.e. the same in 1987 as in 1986), 1.41𝑌 = 𝑌 = 1.14, which implies that 𝑌 = 0.81 (a 19% decline from
its normalized 1986 value of $1). However, TRA86 reduced the corporate tax rate from 46% in 1986 to 40% in 1987.
This decline in the tax rate entails an increase in the net-of-tax share from 0.54 to 0.6 (i.e. by 11%). Using the Gruber
and Rauh (2007) estimate of an ETI of 0.2, 𝑌 would rise by a little over 2%, from 1.14 to 1.165. Then, 1.41𝑌 = 𝑌
= 1.165 in 1987, implying that 𝑌 = 0.83 (a 17% decline from its normalized 1986 value of $1).
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Manzon (1992) divides the sample into firms that face a 10% marginal tax rate on 𝑌 (in the
absence of either tax shield), those that only have unused ITCs and face a 7.5% marginal tax rate,
and those with sufficient NOLs or FTCs that they face a 1% marginal tax rate. The reduction in
the corporate tax rate in TRA86 created an incentive to shift taxable income from 1986 to 1987. If
conforming tax avoidance methods were used for this purpose, book income would incidentally
be shifted to 1987, biasing estimates of tax-motivated earnings management downward. To
address this possibility, Manzon (1992) focuses on discretionary accruals related to long-lived
assets because these accruals are treated differently for book and tax purposes. In particular, the
analysis uses non-cash writedowns (NCW) scaled by assets as its measure of earnings
management. Manzon’s (1992) results imply an ETI in the range of 1.4 to 2.1 (as shown in Table
1).17
4) Discussion
The studies of the impact of the BIA summarized in Table 1 suggest a high degree of
responsiveness of 𝑌 to taxes in circumstances where the tax base is defined as 𝑌 . This seems
contrary to a common intuition that is often expressed by proponents of taxing 𝑌 . As described,
for instance, in Desai and Dharmapala (2009a), this intuition is that taxing 𝑌 would make tax
avoidance more costly by imposing a financial market consequence of having to report lower 𝑌
to investors (as well as making upwards earnings management more costly by imposing higher tax
liability on inflated reports of 𝑌 ). This is a valuable insight, but the evidence reviewed above
(along with other relevant evidence in the accounting literature) seems to point to an opposing
intuition, that the structure of tax law has developed over time to constrain the under-statement of
𝑌 , while financial accounting has evolved to limit the overstatement of 𝑌 . At least if left to its
own devices, financial accounting has little reason to significantly constrain downward earnings
management, as suggested by Watrin, Ebert and Thomsen (2014, p. 58), who refer to the “the near
absence of penalties for under-reporting financial income compared with over-reporting financial
income.” The implication is that downward earnings management may be a more powerful tool
for tax avoidance (if 𝑌

𝑌 ) than is tax planning under the current system where 𝑌

17

𝑌 .

Manzon (1992, Table 5, Panel A) reports a difference of -0.01 in scaled NCW for firms facing AMT rates of 7.5%
or 10% (relative to those facing AMT rates of 1% or less). The mean book income scaled by assets is 0.07 (Manzon,
1992, Table 2). Thus, at the mean, 𝑌 is about 14% lower for firms facing net-of-tax shares of either 0.925 or 0.9,
relative to those facing net-of-tax shares of either 0.99 or 1.
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Under the conditions discussed in Section 2 above, a large ETI implies a large marginal
deadweight cost. As foreshadowed in Section 2, it is quite possible to imagine circumstances in
which the ETI is not a sufficient statistic for the deadweight cost of taxation. However, the
similarity of Equation (5) and Equation (9) suggests that the conditions under which the ETI is
normatively relevant are closely parallel for profit shifting and for earnings management. That is,
if one is skeptical that a large responsiveness of 𝑌 to taxes (when taxable income 𝑌

𝑌 )

indicates a large deadweight loss, then it would generally follow that one should also be skeptical
that a large responsiveness of 𝑌

to taxes (when 𝑌

𝑌 ) implies a large deadweight loss. The

latter position, however, would (at least on efficiency grounds) be somewhat in tension with the
assumed urgency of the GloBE proposal and other measures to combat profit shifting.
It may be argued that the response of firms to the BIA merely involves a timing effect, with
𝑌 being shifted outside the relatively short period in which the BIA was operative. This point has
some validity, and because the BIA was in effect only for three years, it is not necessarily possible
to infer long-run responses from studies of the BIA. However, it should be remembered that
earnings management is always primarily a matter of timing. It is also possible that the
responsiveness of 𝑌 to taxes may be reduced by making adjustments to 𝑌 when using it as a tax
base. To the extent that such modifications mirror tax accounting rules, however, this approach
calls into question why one might wish to use 𝑌 as a tax base in the first place.
The foregoing discussion generally accepts the credibility of the estimates reported in the
accounting literature on the BIA. However, a number of significant concerns have been highlighted
within the accounting literature itself. Choi, Gramlich and Thomas (2001) raise questions about
the robustness of the results in the BIA literature to a variety of factors, including the use of
alternative scaling variables and the use of different treatment and control groups. They conclude
that while they “do not claim that earnings were not managed in response to the BIA . . . we wish
. . . to convince readers that the case is not closed” (p. 578).18 Shackelford and Shevlin (2001, p.
369) argue that the treatment and control groups of firms used in the studies (in most cases, firms
that are inferred to be subject to the AMT and those that are not) may be subject to self-selection.
In particular, the BIA was intentionally directed at firms with low 𝑌

18

and high 𝑌 , and the

See also the response by Dhaliwal (2001).
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earnings management practices of these firms (which tend to be those in the treatment group
subject to the AMT) may not be representative of firms in general.
While many of these concerns are valid, it should also be noted that there are number of
potential factors that would result in an underestimation of the effect. In particular, TRA86 reduced
the corporate tax rate, and so created an incentive to shift 𝑌

from 1986 to later years. This may

have had the effect of also shifting some component of 𝑌

in the same direction through

conforming tax avoidance methods. The AMT was creditable against the firm’s regular corporate
tax liability in later years, mitigating (in present value terms) the burden of being subject to the
AMT. In addition, the BIA literature’s finding of a large amount of earnings management in
response to the BIA is arguably broadly consistent with the results of a more recent cross-country
literature. The latter studies (e.g. Watrin, Ebert and Thomsen, 2014; Blaylock, Gaertner and
Shevlin, 2015) compare earnings management at firms based in countries with different degrees
of book-tax conformity, and generally tends to find that earnings management is more prevalent
among firms facing high levels of conformity (i.e. where 𝑌

and 𝑌 are more similarly defined).

Ultimately, if we do not find the estimates in the BIA literature to be credible, that leaves
us with the priors of the most relevant scholarly community, namely financial accounting
researchers. As noted previously, this community is strongly opposed to the taxation of 𝑌 , in part
because of an expectation that 𝑌 would be highly responsive to taxes under such a regime (and
applying the ETI approach from public finance would further imply that this high responsiveness
may entail significant deadweight costs). To overcome this strong prior, one would need to show
a “precise zero” estimate – i.e. that the BIA or other instances in which 𝑌 is subject to tax
consequences lead to a small and precisely estimated impact on 𝑌 . However, no such estimates
have emerged in the literature, and recent proponents of taxing 𝑌 have not produced evidence of
this nature in support of their proposals. It is also worth bearing in mind that the responsiveness of
𝑌 to taxation is not merely important for revenue estimation, but is also potentially relevant for
understanding the deadweight loss - and hence the normative desirability - of these proposals.
5) Conclusion
The idea of taxing financial statement income is undergoing a significant revival, especially
in view of the OECD’s (2019a) GloBE proposal. This paper develops a conceptual framework –
based on the ETI literature – to assess the normative desirability of such proposals in terms of the
15
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responsiveness of financial statement income to taxes. It also discusses the available evidence on
the tax elasticity of financial statement income. The central conclusion is that the most relevant
evidence (from the BIA literature, although it has significant limitations) suggests a large
responsiveness of financial statement income to taxes (and hence, albeit with important caveats,
arguably a large deadweight loss). The paper also highlights the need for more evidence on this
question before proceeding with the current proposals.
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Figure 1: Alternative Tax Bases for the OECD GloBE Proposal

Parent

A
i)

YT = YATLA + YBTLB

ii) YT = YATLA + YBTLA
Lowtax sub

iii) YT = YF

B

YT: tax base
YTL: taxable income defined by tax law
YF: consolidated financial statement income
Note: This figure represents alternative tax bases considered in OECD (2019a). 𝑌
is taxable
is taxable income defined by the tax law
income defined by the tax law of country A, and 𝑌
of country B.
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Table 1: Reported and Implied Elasticities of Taxable Income (ETI)
Tax Base

Study

Sample

Tax Law Income
(YT= YTL)

Gruber and Rauh
(2007)
Devereux, Liu and
Loretz (2014)

US firms (Compustat)

Dhaliwal and Wang
(1992)
Manzon (1992)

US firms (Compustat)

1.7

US firms subject to the
AMT (hand-collected)

1.4 to
2.1

Financial Statement
Income (YT= YF)

UK firms around
£300,000 “kink” (tax
return data)

Reported Implied
ETI
ETI
0.2
0.13 to
0.17

Note: See text for details.
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